Indus Water Treaty
INTRODUCTION
The Indus Waters Treaty established a legally binding arrangement between India and Pakistan with mediation by the World Bank. The agreement imposed a structured division of the Indus Basin rivers and defined how both
states would exercise control over shared water resources. The treaty assigned the eastern rivers to India while granting Pakistan primary rights over the western rivers, thereby institutionalizing a fixed allocation that reduced
direct contestation over access (World Bank, 1960). This division created operational clarity, yet it also positioned Pakistan as a downstream actor dependent on upstream conduct, embedding a structural imbalance within the
framework.
The basin itself sustains a vast population whose livelihoods depend directly on water availability. The agricultural sector, energy production systems and basic human consumption all rely on uninterrupted river flows. This
dependency transforms water into a strategic necessity rather than a purely economic resource. The treaty responded to this reality by restricting how each side could utilize water, particularly by limiting storage and diversion on rivers allocated to Pakistan. These restrictions aimed to prevent upstream manipulation while allowing limited development within defined technical parameters (Wolf & Newton, 2008).
The institutional design of the treaty reinforced this balance through continuous engagement mechanisms. The Permanent Indus Commission created a formal channel for communication, enabling both sides to exchange hydrological data, address concerns and maintain operational transparency. This arrangement ensured that river management remained predictable and insulated from political volatility. The treaty further introduced a graded dispute resolution system, allowing technical disagreements to move to a Neutral Expert and legal disputes to escalate to a Court of Arbitration. This layered structure prevented disputes from stagnating and ensured that disagreements remained within a procedural framework rather than escalating into confrontation (Salman & Uprety, 2002).
The treaty’s durability stemmed from this combination of legal clarity and institutional continuity. The framework did not eliminate rivalry; instead, it regulated it by imposing rules that both parties had to follow. This balance allowed cooperation to persist even during periods of political hostility. However, the same structure also contained vulnerabilities. The classification of disputes as either technical or legal influences the route of resolution and this classification itself can become contested. This ambiguity allows engineering design and legal interpretation to function as instruments of influence rather than neutral processes. The treaty therefore operates as both a mechanism of cooperation and a system that permits strategic maneuvering within its provisions.
CURRENT STATUS (POST-2025 ABEYANCE PHASE)
The current phase of the treaty reflects a decisive departure from its original logic. The April 2025 decision by India to place the treaty in abeyance following the Pahalgam incident altered the operational foundation of water
governance between the two states. This move did not formally terminate the agreement; instead, it introduced legal ambiguity that allowed disengagement from obligations while avoiding outright withdrawal. This approach enabled India to suspend compliance selectively, thereby shifting the treaty from a binding framework to a conditional
arrangement shaped by political considerations.
This shift has disrupted the institutional mechanisms that previously ensured stability. The functioning of the Permanent Indus Commission has weakened significantly, reducing opportunities for structured dialogue. The
suspension of regular data exchange has removed a critical tool for managing river flows, particularly for flood forecasting and irrigation planning. The absence of reliable hydrological information has increased uncertainty,
forcing each side to operate with limited visibility into upstream or downstream conditions. This breakdown in coordination has undermined the predictability that the treaty once guaranteed (Khalid & Begum, 2020). The operational environment on the ground has also changed.
The authorities now exercise greater discretion over water releases, leading to temporary interruptions and variable discharge patterns. These actions do not require large-scale infrastructural changes to produce impact; adjustments in timing alone can disrupt agricultural cycles and water distribution systems. This capacity to regulate flows introduces a new dimension of control, allowing upstream actors to influence downstream conditions without breaching physical constraints. The shift from regulated management to discretionary control marks a fundamental transformation in how water functions within the bilateral relationship.
The dispute resolution architecture has effectively stalled under these conditions. The absence of active engagement has prevented disputes from progressing through established channels. This situation creates a legal vacuum where disagreements accumulate without resolution. The inability to classify and address disputes within the treaty framework increases the likelihood that technical issues will migrate into political domains. Once disputes enter that space, they become more complex and less amenable to structured settlement, thereby raising the risk of escalation (Mustafa, 2010).
The environmental context further intensifies these challenges. The basin has experienced significant changes due to glacier retreat and shifting monsoon patterns, which have altered the timing and volume of river flows. The treaty does not incorporate mechanisms to address these changes, as it was designed in a different climatic context. The current suspension reduces the capacity for joint adaptation, leaving both states to respond independently to shared environmental pressures. This fragmentation weakens overall resilience and increases the likelihood of mismanagement during extreme events.
The cumulative impact of these developments has eroded the treaty’s stabilizing role. The framework no longer provides the certainty required for long-term planning or conflict mitigation. The transition from rule-based governance to discretionary control has transformed water into a strategic variable within the broader relationship. This transformation carries significant implications for regional stability, as it removes one of the few remaining areas of structured cooperation. The treaty once functioned as a buffer against escalation; its weakening now exposes the basin to heightened risk and uncertainty.
DIVERGING STRATEGIC POSITIONS ON
THE INDUS WATERS TREATY
i. Indian Stance
The Indian position situates water governance within a broader national security framework rather than treating it as a purely technical arrangement under the Indus Waters Treaty. The policy direction connects water management to strategic stability, in which compliance no longer functions as an automatic legal obligation but as a conditional practice shaped by geopolitical considerations. This shift redefines the treaty environment and reduces the insulation that previously separated water from political contestation (Zawahri, 2008).
The legal posture relies on maintaining ambiguity rather than initiating a formal exit. The designation of “abeyance” creates a grey legal space where obligations remain suspended without triggering treaty termination procedures. This approach preserves strategic flexibility while weakening enforceability. The resulting space allows selective engagement with treaty provisions, especially those related to consultation timelines and procedural constraints. The operational trajectory prioritizes expanded utilization of western river systems. The policy emphasis strengthens hydropower development and enhances storage capacity across multiple projects. The acceleration of infrastructure reflects a dual objective: meeting domestic energy demand while increasing control over the timing and regulation of flows. This adjustment elevates hydrological infrastructure into a strategic asset within national planning frameworks (Subramanian et al., 2012).
The post-abeyance environment removes procedural barriers that previously required advance coordination. The absence of notification requirements increases administrative autonomy in project execution. This operational shift allows faster implementation cycles and reduces external scrutiny over design and scheduling decisions. The treaty framework therefore, loses its earlier regulatory influence over domestic infrastructure planning. The strategic logic positions water as an instrument within broader geopolitical competition. The emphasis on control over flow timing introduces a form of leverage that operates through infrastructure rather than overt disruption. The policy narrative frames this approach as an adaptation to changing environmental and developmental conditions, particularly climate variability and rising water demand. This justification supports a gradual reinterpretation of treaty constraints without formally rejecting its structure (Swain, 2011).
HYDROPOWER EXPANSION AND DEMOGRAPHIC
ENGINEERING (POST-ABEYANCE PHASE)
The 2025 suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty opened political and administrative space for India to accelerate hydropower expansion across Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir. These projects do not operate as neutral
development initiatives aimed at protecting Kashmiri rights or improving local welfare. These projects strengthen India’s upstream control over the Chenab and Jhelum River systems while expanding strategic leverage against
Pakistan. The policy direction prioritizes national energy demands, river regulation capacity and territorial consolidation, whereas Kashmiri communities continue to face land acquisition, ecological disruption and exclusion
from resource ownership
i. Pakal Dul Hydroelectric Project (1000 MW – Chenab River)
The Pakal Dul Hydroelectric Project advances as the largest hydropower installation in the Chenab basin with a planned capacity of 1000 MW. The project includes a concrete-face rock-fill dam and a major storage reservoir
designed to regulate seasonal flows. The acceleration of tunnel excavation and dam construction after the 2025 treaty abeyance demonstrates India’s intent to maximize upstream control rather than address local development
priorities.
The project occupies large areas of land in Kishtwar district, while the generated electricity primarily serves India’s broader energy strategy. The reservoir structure increases India’s ability to control release timing on the Chenab River, transforming water infrastructure into a geopolitical instrument. The project therefore expands Indian strategic influence while Kashmiri communities bear displacement, environmental degradation and resource loss.
ii. Ratle Hydroelectric Project (850 MW – Chenab River)
The Ratle Hydroelectric Project carries a planned capacity of 850 MW and operates as a central component of India’s Chenab basin strategy. The project entered fast-tracked execution after procedural constraints weakened under the post-abeyance environment. The construction includes dam infrastructure, diversion tunnels and powerhouse installations intended to support peaking power generation and discharge regulation.
The project strengthens India’s cumulative control over western rivers allocated to Pakistan under the treaty framework. The operational model allows India to manipulate timing of water releases through coordinated dam management. The project therefore serves strategic regulation objectives rather than Kashmiri public interests. The surrounding population continues to experience land occupation and environmental pressure without proportional economic ownership or political participation.
iii. Kiru Hydroelectric Project (624 MW – Chenab River)
The Kiru Hydroelectric Project advances with a planned capacity of 624 MW through a concrete gravity dam and underground powerhouse system. The project forms part of an interconnected hydropower chain alongside Ratle and Kwar. The accelerated construction phase after 2025 increased India’s ability to establish synchronized flow regulation across multiple installations. The project does not grant Kashmiri communities control over river resources or energy distribution. The infrastructure instead integrates occupied territory into India’s national hydropower grid. The coordinated release mechanisms across linked dams strengthen upstream authority over seasonal discharge patterns, thereby increasing strategic influence over downstream flows into Pakistan.
iv. Kwar Hydroelectric Project (540 MW – Chenab River)
The Kwar Hydroelectric Project contributes 540 MW of installed capacity and functions as a downstream extension of the Kiru installation. The project advances through rapid tunneling operations and structural expansion designed to optimize coordinated water regulation across the Chenab cascade system. The project increases India’s cumulative storage and discharge management capability while further consolidating infrastructural control inside occupied territory. The surrounding communities continue to face environmental stress, land pressure and restricted participation in resource governance. The project therefore advances state-centric strategic interests rather than equitable regional development.
v. Sawalkot Hydroelectric Project (~1856 MW – Chenab Basin)
The Sawalkot Hydroelectric Project carries an estimated capacity of approximately 1856 MW, making it one of the largest proposed installations in the region. The revival of planning activity after treaty suspension demonstrates
India’s intent to expand long-term storage-based regulation on western rivers. The scale of the project significantly increases India’s capacity to influence seasonal river behaviour through reservoir management. The project also deepens infrastructural penetration into occupied territory under the language of economic modernization. The generated benefits primarily support India’s national energy and strategic priorities, Kashmiri populations face ecological disruption and intensified control over local natural resources.
vi. Kirthai I & II Hydroelectric Projects (~1320 MW Combined – Chenab Basin)
The Kirthai I and II projects collectively contribute approximately 1320 MW of planned capacity through diversion systems, underground powerhouses and high-pressure tunnels. The projects strengthen India’s cascading hydropower network across the Chenab basin. The combined infrastructure expands cumulative flow regulation capability and enhances centralized management of western rivers. The projects further institutionalize Indian control over Kashmir’s water resources while limiting local ownership over land and hydrological assets. The development strategy therefore prioritizes strategic consolidation instead of protecting Kashmiri economic or environmental rights.
vii. Baglihar Hydroelectric Project (900 MW – Chenab River)
The Baglihar Hydroelectric Project maintains an installed capacity of 900 MW and remains one of the most strategically significant dams on the Chenab River. The post-abeyance phase enabled reservoir flushing operations
that India previously could not conduct under treaty restrictions. The sediment removal process increased storage efficiency and improved turbine performance. The expanded reservoir control also strengthened India’s flexibility in regulating seasonal discharge patterns. The project therefore functions as a strategic regulation mechanism rather than a localized development initiative benefiting Kashmiris.
viii. Salal Hydroelectric Project (690 MW – Chenab River)
The Salal Hydroelectric Project operates with a capacity of 690 MW and underwent major reservoir flushing operations after the 2025 treaty suspension. The sediment removal process restored turbine efficiency and expanded
storage management capability after decades of operational restrictions. The project now enables improved discharge regulation and seasonal control across the Chenab system. The operational changes strengthen India’s upstream leverage while occupied populations continue to experience environmental consequences without corresponding authority over resource governance.
ix. Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project (330 MW – Jhelum River)
The Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project operates with a capacity of 330 MW through an inter-tributary diversion design on the Jhelum River system. The project transfers water flows to optimize energy production and increase
basin-level control. The project generated long-standing concerns regarding downstream flow impacts and ecological disruption. The operational structure prioritizes strategic water utilization and national power generation rather than safeguarding Kashmiri environmental security or local resource rights.
x. Tulbul Navigation Project (Jhelum River – Revival Phase)
The Tulbul Navigation Project re-entered policy discussions after the treaty abeyance as part of broader infrastructure expansion on the Jhelum River. The project focuses on constructing a control structure capable of regulating water levels during low-flow periods. The revival effort expands India’s capacity to influence Jhelum basin flows while strengthening administrative control over navigation and seasonal discharge management. The project therefore operates within a broader strategy of hydrological consolidation rather than a people-centered development framework.
xi. Canal Expansion Project (113 km Canal + 14 km Tunnel)
The canal expansion initiative includes a 113-kilometer canal system and a 14-kilometer tunnel intended to redirect Indus basin waters toward Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan and Delhi. The project expands inter-basin transfer capacity and strengthens India’s internal redistribution network. The initiative openly redirects resources originating in occupied Kashmir toward other Indian regions without addressing Kashmiri ownership or consent. The project therefore converts Kashmir’s rivers into instruments of external supply and strategic advantage while local populations continue to lose control over land, water and environmental security.
• Political Implications of Hydropower Expansion
The hydropower expansion across IoK advances India’s strategic and economic interests rather than protecting Kashmiri rights or local development priorities. The current installed hydropower capacity stands at approximately
3540 MW, while ongoing projects aim to increase capacity to nearly 5164 MW by 2026 through the commissioning of Pakal Dul, Kiru and Ratle projects. The long-term target projects total capacity reaching nearly 10,000–11,000 MW by 2035 across the Chenab and Jhelum basins. The expansion strategy transforms Kashmir’s rivers into instruments of external energy supply for India while occupied communities continue to face land acquisition, ecological degradation and loss of control over natural resources. The concentration of large-scale dams and diversion structures across the region does not prioritize Kashmiri economic sovereignty. The policy instead integrates occupied territory into India’s national energy grid and strengthens centralized control over water infrastructure. The large-scale extraction of hydrological resources therefore advances occupation-linked economic consolidation under the language of development and modernization. The rapid expansion of hydropower infrastructure strengthens India’s upstream authority over the Chenab and 1011 Jhelum river systems. The concentration of high-capacity projects across the basin increases India’s ability to regulate discharge timing, seasonal flows and reservoir storage patterns.
The transition from treaty-constrained operations toward expanded storage capability increases flexibility in controlling river behaviour across interconnected projects. The synchronized management of dams, tunnels and
reservoirs enables coordinated flow modulation across multiple installations simultaneously. The infrastructure network therefore functions as a strategic pressure architecture rather than a neutral development framework.
The projects also deepen India’s administrative and territorial consolidation inside occupied Kashmir. The growing control over rivers, land and energy systems reduces Kashmiri ownership over local resources while strengthening India’s bargaining capacity within broader regional geopolitics. The hydropower expansion therefore serves strategic dominance and resource extraction far more than public welfare or equitable regional
development.
POLITICAL DYNAMICS, LEGAL FRAGILITY AND EMERGING HYDRO-STRATEGIC
ORDER IN THE INDUS BASIN
LEGAL AND TECHNICAL VULNERABILITIES OF THE INDUS WATERS TREATY
The Indus Waters Treaty establishes a formal dispute-resolution framework under Article IX through the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC), a Neutral Expert and the Court of Arbitration. The PIC conducts technical consultations, supervises data exchange and addresses operational disagreements, while the Neutral Expert examines engineering disputes involving dam design, storage capacity and hydropower specifications. The Court of Arbitration intervenes when disputes exceed technical interpretation and enter the legal domain of treaty compliance and rights allocation
(World Bank, 1960).
The treaty contains a critical structural weakness within the classification of disputes as either “technical differences” or “legal disputes.” This categorization determines whether a matter proceeds to a Neutral Expert or a Court of Arbitration. The ambiguity surrounding classification creates procedural space that allows politically sensitive issues to remain confined within technical channels rather than entering binding legal scrutiny (Mustafa, 2010).
The Baglihar dispute demonstrated how engineering design can alter operational control without formally breaching treaty language. The Neutral Expert permitted modifications in dam design and spillway configuration, increasing operational flexibility over flow management while remaining within interpreted treaty parameters (Salman & Uprety, 2013). The Kishanganga arbitration further exposed interpretive fragility when downstream usage rights and diversion mechanisms became subject to competing legal readings (Wolf & Newton, 2008).
The post-2025 abeyance phase intensified these vulnerabilities. The suspension of procedural obligations weakened prior-notification requirements, disrupted institutional coordination and reduced hydrological transparency.
These actions generated wider concerns under international treaty law regarding unilateral suspension of binding obligations.
• International Legal Principles And Violations
The principle of pacta sunt servanda under Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires states to implement treaties in good faith. The unilateral suspension of treaty obligations without mutual consent
challenges this foundational rule of international law. The Vienna Convention also restricts arbitrary suspension or termination of treaties outside recognized legal procedures. The absence of mutual agreement or internationally accepted legal justification raises serious questions regarding the legality of selective disengagement from treaty commitments.
The principles of equitable and reasonable utilization under international watercourse law require upper-riparian states to avoid disproportionate harm to downstream populations. The obligation to prevent significant transboundary harm further prohibits actions that threaten agricultural systems, flood management and civilian water security across borders.
The doctrine of customary international law governing shared rivers also obligates continuous cooperation, prior notification and regular information exchange on projects affecting transboundary flows. The disruption of
hydrological data-sharing after 2025 weakened flood forecasting, irrigation planning and seasonal water management downstream.
• Technical Control As A Strategic Instrument
The reservoir flushing operations at Salal and Baglihar after decades of restrictions demonstrated how technical actions can rapidly alter storage efficiency and operational flexibility. The acceleration of storage-oriented projects on the Chenab basin further increased upstream regulatory capacity over timing and discharge patterns.
The strategic importance no longer lies solely in volume control; timing now functions as the decisive instrument of influence. Controlled releases during sowing seasons, low-flow periods or flood cycles can affect irrigation systems, hydropower scheduling and downstream economic stability without requiring permanent river diversion. The engineering structure of dams, spillway gates, diversion tunnels and storage reservoirs therefore operates within a geopolitical framework rather than a purely developmental one. These technical mechanisms now shape strategic leverage, downstream vulnerability and regional stability simultaneously.
• Hybrid Coercion And Hydro-Political Transformation
The Indus Waters Treaty now operates within a hybrid coercion environment where hydrological management carries strategic intent alongside technical function. The system no longer functions as a neutral water-sharing
arrangement, as operational decisions increasingly shape political signalling between upstream and downstream actors. The water regime functions as a strategic signal when India regulates flows, manages reservoirs and restricts hydrological data exchange. These actions influence downstream planning certainty in Pakistan by altering expectations of seasonal stability. The absence of predictable flow information weakens agricultural scheduling, irrigation forecasting and energy planning, creating structural uncertainty in dependent systems (Khalid & Begum,
2020).
The water system also operates as a pressure mechanism when release timing and discharge adjustments generate variability in critical cultivation periods. These controlled fluctuations disrupt downstream agricultural cycles and increase vulnerability during peak sowing and harvesting seasons. The timing of water becomes more influential than total volume, turning temporal control into a key point of leverage.
The post-2025 phase intensifies this transformation by shifting water governance from implicit leverage to explicit geopolitical signalling. Operational choices in river management now carry direct strategic meaning, where each adjustment in flow or storage communicates intent within the broader bilateral relationship. This shift reduces the separation between technical water management and political decision-making. The structure of hydro-hegemony explains this imbalance through upstream dominance and downstream dependency.
The upstream position allows India to regulate seasonal flows and adjust release patterns, while Pakistan remains exposed to variability originating outside its control (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). This asymmetry increases strategic sensitivity across the basin. The control over timing of flows emerges as the decisive factor shaping agricultural cycles, hydropower generation and flood-risk exposure. This temporal authority turns river governance into a tool of influence, in which scheduling decisions reshape downstream stability and redefine water as an instrument of strategic power rather than a shared
resource.
CONCLUSION
The Indus Waters Treaty no longer operates as a neutral technical framework separated from political contestation; it now functions within a charged strategic environment where water governance, infrastructure expansion and
security calculations intersect directly. The post-2025 abeyance phase has disrupted the cooperative architecture that previously maintained predictability across the basin. The breakdown of hydrological data exchange, weakened institutional coordination and growing uncertainty in dispute resolution have reduced the treaty’s operational reliability, particularly for downstream agricultural planning and water-dependent economic systems.
The expansion of hydropower infrastructure in Jammu and Kashmir deepens this structural shift. These projects do not operate as neutral development interventions; they expand upstream control over storage capacity, flow timing and discharge regulation. This creates a durable asymmetry in a basin already defined by downstream dependence, where even limited adjustments in water release patterns generate significant systemic consequences. Water governance therefore moves beyond engineering management and becomes an instrument of strategic positioning.
The legal framework of the treaty still exists, but its effectiveness now depends on sustained political commitment to cooperative interpretation and procedural discipline. Once disputes shift between technical classification and legal adjudication, outcomes become shaped by strategic calculation rather than institutional neutrality. This weakens the treaty’s ability to function as a consistent stabilizing mechanism.
Climate variability intensifies this fragility. Glacial retreat, irregular monsoon behaviour and shifting seasonal flows undermine the fixed allocation logic on which the treaty was originally constructed. These environmental pressures reduce predictability and increase the frequency of operational stress across the basin. The future of the Indus framework depends on whether both states prioritize restraint and institutional continuity over strategic leverage. Without adaptive reform and renewed commitment to transparency, the treaty risks evolving from a mechanism of cooperation into a recurring source of strategic contestation across South Asia.
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